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Abstract
Emergencies are exceptions to the rule. Laws that respond to emergencies can create exceptions to rules
that protect human rights. In long lasting emergencies, these exceptions can become the rule, diluting
human rights and eroding the rule of law. In the United States, the COVID-19 pandemic prompted states
to change rules governing commercial and personal activities to prevent the spread of the coronavirus.
Many governors’ executive orders were challenged as violations of the constitutionally protected rights
of those affected. Judges are deciding whether emergencies can justify more restrictions than would be
permitted in normal circumstances and whether some rights deserve more protection than others, even
in an emergency. This article analyzes ongoing litigation involving emergency restrictions on religious free-
dom and access to reproductive health services. These cases suggest that some judges are altering the stan-
dards of judicial review of the state’s emergency powers in ways that could permanently strengthen some
rights and dilute others in normal circumstances.
Keywords: Judicial review; constitutional law; pandemic; religious freedom; abortion
A. Introduction
Judicial review can expand or contract the permissible exercise of state power and protect or
diminish human rights. Judicial review establishes standards for determining how important
our particular rights are, and how, when and why the state can restrict those rights. These stan-
dards are rules that govern our daily lives. But emergencies disrupt our daily lives. Emergencies are
exceptions to the rule. Laws that respond to emergencies can create exceptions to rules that protect
human rights. Emergencies can justify more coercive measures than would be permitted in nor-
mal circumstances. In long lasting emergencies, these exceptions can become the rule, perma-
nently diluting human rights and eroding the rule of law.
Should emergencies change the rules that govern infectious disease control? If so, when and
how? Do some rights deserve greater protection than others, even in an emergency? Judges are
being asked to decide these questions. How judges frame and analyze the exercise of government
authority during an emergency can have long-lasting influence on government power and human
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rights. This is especially true when the emergency arises from contagious diseases, such as the
coronavirus pandemic that began in late 2019 and has continued well into 2021.
Courts in the United States are reviewing an unprecedented number of legal claims contending
that emergency executive orders issued by state governors during the coronavirus pandemic vio-
late constitutionally protected rights. Cases involving two such rights—the right to terminate a
pregnancy and the right to freely exercise religion—suggest that certain judges are altering the
standards of judicial review of the state’s emergency powers in ways that could permanently
weaken the former right and strengthen the latter. These decisions suggest that a state of emer-
gency offers the judiciary an opportunity to selectively and permanently expand or diminish pro-
tection for rights.
This Article proceeds as follows: Section B summarizes the emergency measures that states in
the United States took to control coronavirus spread. Section C explains the methods of analysis or
standards of review used by the judiciary to assess what justifies limiting constitutionally protected
rights. Section D explores how some courts have lowered the standard of review to limit the con-
stitutional right to terminate a pregnancy during the COVID pandemic. Section E examines a
counter example, court decisions making the standard stricter to give greater protection to reli-
gious activities. Both trends can threaten public health and undermine human rights. Section F
examines the implications of these examples for judicial review in non-emergencies. The Article
concludes that the judiciary need not and should not use a pandemic to alter human rights to
protect public health. Doing so threatens not only human rights and public health, but also
the integrity of the judiciary.
B. Emergency Orders to Control the Coronavirus Pandemic
Every country has tried to slow the spread of the SARS-CoV-2 virus. In the United States, control
measures included recommendations to wear masks, keep two meters distance from others, and
mandatory limits on public gatherings. The Secretary of Health and Human Services declared a
national emergency on January 31, 2020, and then President Trump renewed it on July 23, 2020.1
These declarations authorized the United States federal government to take dramatic steps to con-
trol the pandemic.2 Apart from federal legislation providing financial assistance for vaccine devel-
opment and economic hardship,3 however, it took few direct actions. For example, early errors
and delays in testing supplies left the country with few options except social distancing—keeping
people apart.4 For most of 2020, the federal government left it up to the states to initiate formal
mitigation measures.5 After Joe Biden became President on January 20, 2021, the federal
1U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Services, Determination that a Public Health Emergency Exists (Jan. 31, 2020), https://
www.phe.gov/emergency/news/healthactions/phe/Pages/2019-nCoV.aspx; Office of the President, Proclamation 9994 (Mar.
13, 2020) https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/03/18/2020-05794/declaring-a-national-emergency-concerning-
the-novel-coronavirus-disease-covid-19-outbreak.
2Stafford Act, 51 U.S.C. §§5121–5208; National Emergencies Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1651; Defense Production Act, 50
U.S.C. §§ 4501–4568.
3The President signed legislation in March 2020 providing financial assistance to individuals, businesses, and states and
funding for vaccine development and public health programs, although this legislation did not require or use emergency
authorization. Families First Coronavirus Response Act, 134 Stat. 177; and the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, And Economic
Security (CARES) Act, 134 Stat. 281.
4Michael D. Shear, Abby Goodnough, Sheila Kaplan, Sheri Fink, Katie Thomas & Noah Weiland, The Lost Month: How a
Failure to Test Blinded the U.S. to Covid-19, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Mar. 28, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/28/us/
testing-coronavirus-pandemic.html.
5President Trump underplayed the risk of coronavirus transmission, the severity of the pandemic, did not recommend
wearing masks, opposed closing schools, churches, and businesses, and persuaded many federal officials—with the exception
of Dr. Anthony Fauci—to follow suit, often contrary to their own expert opinions. Juana Summers, Timeline: How Trump Has
Downplayed The Coronavirus Pandemic, NPR (Oct. 20, 2020), https://www.npr.org/sections/latest-updates-trump-covid-19-
results/2020/10/02/919432383/how-trump-has-downplayed-the-coronavirus-pandemic. See generally, Yasmeen Abutaleb &
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government took a more proactive approach, focusing on speeding up vaccine distribution and
providing financial assistance to people and businesses in need.
Traditionally, the states have been primarily responsible for controlling infectious diseases,
although they have received considerable funding from the federal government to do so. This
means that the actions taken by the states to control the coronavirus pandemic come from
the same power states have to control infectious disease during ordinary, non-emergency times.6
It is the sovereign power to pass laws to protect the health, safety, and welfare of the population in
the state, known as the “police power.”7 It is the authority that a state legislature uses to pass
virtually all statutes: Criminal laws; state and local tax laws; laws protecting the environment; laws
requiring licensure of health facilities and professionals; laws requiring residents to be covered by
health insurance; laws requiring vaccinations; and laws governing how to respond to emergencies.
Any authority that the federal Constitution does not assign to the federal level of government
remains with the states.
In the United States, the coronavirus pandemic and the federal government’s limited response
prompted state governors to impose rules governing commercial and personal activities to prevent
the spread of the coronavirus. By April 2020, all fifty states and the District of Columbia had
declared a state of emergency, which authorized their governors to issue executive orders.8
Such orders included extending the deadline for receipt of mailed ballots for the November 3,
2020 election, limiting the number of people at public gatherings, in retail businesses, in airlines,
trains, buses, worship services, and complete closures of schools, art, entertainment venues, and
certain businesses and medical services.9 They also recommended that people stay at home, wear
masks, and practice social distancing in public. States varied in the measures they chose. Some
mandatory measures were expected to be temporary. Some were lifted later in the year to allow
businesses to open in order to revitalize a devastated economy. Subsequent waves of increased
coronavirus infections, however, persuaded some governors to continue or reimpose restrictions.
C. Judicial Review of Executive Orders
Many governors’ executive orders were—and still are being—challenged as violations of the con-
stitutionally protected rights of those affected.10 Because the executive orders vary in detail from
Damian Paletta, NIGHTMARE SCENARIO: INSIDE THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION’S RESPONSE TO THE PANDEMIC THAT CHANGED
HISTORY (2021).
6See generally Wendy E. Parmet, Health Care and the Constitution: Public Health and the Role of the State in the Framing
Era, 20 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 267 (1992).
7Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 73 (1824) (“[the police power is] the power of promoting the public welfare by restraining
and regulating the use of liberty and property”). See generally Ernst Freund, THE POLICE POWER: PUBLIC POWER AND
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS (1904); T.M. Cooley, A TREATISE ON THE LIMITATIONS OF POLICE POWER IN THE UNITED
STATES CONSIDERED FROM BOTH A CIVIL AND CRIMINAL LAW STANDPOINT (1868).
8All states have laws authorizing responses to emergencies in general, and many have additional laws specific to public
health emergencies, with varying definitions and provisions. Benjamin Della Rocca, Samantha Fry, Masha Simonova &
Jacques Singer-Emery, State Emergency Authorities to Address COVID-19, LAWFARE (May 4, 2020), https://www.
lawfareblog.com/state-emergency-authorities-address-covid-19. The Network for Public Health Law, Emergency
Declaration Authorities Across All States and D.C., TABLE, https://www.networkforphl.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/
Emergency-Declaration-Authorities.pdf. See, e.g., Fabick v. Evers, 956 N.W.2d 856 (Wis. 2021) (interpreting Wisc. Stat. §
323.10); Desrosiers v. Governor, 486 Mass. 369, 158 N.E.3d 827 (Mass. 2020) (interpreting Massachusetts Civil Defense
Act, 1950 Mass. Acts c. 639. § 5).
9See Benjamin Della Rocca et al., supra note 8.
10See, e.g., League of Indep. Fitness Facilities & Trainers, Inc. v. Whitmer, 814 Fed. Appx. 125 (6th Cir. 2020) (fitness facili-
ties); Roberts v. Neace, 958 F.3d 409 (6th Cir. 2020) (religious services); Peterson v. Kunkel, 492 F.Supp. 3d 1183 (D.N.M.
2020) (private school); Ass’n of Jewish Camp Operators v. Cuomo, 479 F.Supp. 3d 197 (N.D.N.Y. 2020) (overnight children’s
camps); Chrysafis v. James, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72602, 2021 WL 1405884 (E.D.N.Y. 2021) (eviction proceedings); DeSantis
v. Florida Ed. Ass‘n, No 1D20-2470 (1st Dist. Ct. App. 2020) (school reopening); County of Butler v. Wolf, 486 F. Supp. 3d 883
(W.D. Pa. Sept. 14, 2020) (limits on political gatherings and business closures), stay denied, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17630 (W.D.
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state to state, judicial decisions are often quite fact specific.11 For example, states like New York
and California imposed different levels of restrictions in different parts of the state, based on the
prevalence of coronavirus cases and deaths. Moreover, few cases reached the United States
Supreme Court and fewer have been decided on the merits.12 Most were on what is known as
the “shadow docket”—emergency appeals from decisions temporarily restraining the enforcement
of COVID restrictions pending hearings on the merits.13 Nevertheless, even preliminary decisions
indicate likely outcomes. Thus, the judiciary plays a pivotal role in deciding which emergency
measures are permissible.
A threshold question in most cases was what method of analysis—standard of review—the
court should apply to the claim. Judicial decision-making depends almost entirely on the choice
of the standard of review. The choice determines the scope of state authority to curtail constitu-
tionally protected rights, including the right to access medical care, freely exercise one’s religion,
vote, and peaceably assemble. Courts are struggling with the degree to which a pandemic empow-
ers the government to limit the freedom of its population. Under what circumstances? For how
long? Does this change the balance between government power and individual rights indefinitely?
This section presents a brief overview of the three general categories of judicial review devel-
oped by the U.S. Supreme Court to evaluate claims of infringement of constitutional rights. It then
describes a current controversy over what standards of review should apply in emergencies. These
cases suggest that the litigants—and perhaps the judges—may be taking advantage of the emer-
gency circumstances to push the standards of judicial review farther in one direction or the other.
The outcome will decide the scope of executive power and the human rights of affected individuals
beyond the coronavirus pandemic.
I. Standards of Judicial Review in the United States
Beginning in the 1960s, the Supreme Court of the United States began developing analytic meth-
ods or standards of review by which to assess whether a federal, state, or local law violated a con-
stitutional right. The use of a particular method of analysis was often viewed as preferable to
choosing among competing theories of justice that were not universally accepted, or as a way
to avoid accusations that the Justices were merely imposing their own personal preferences or
philosophies of justice.14 In general, each right protected by the United States Constitution is
assigned a value—fundamental, important, or ordinary—creating a hierarchy of constitutional
rights.15 The more important the right, the more justification government needs to restrict it.
Pa. 2020); Dark Storm Indus. LLC v. Cuomo, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120514, 2020 WL 3833107 (N.D.N.Y. 2020) (authority to
define “essential” services); Bayley’s Campground, Inc. v. Mills, 463 F.Supp. 3d 22 (D. Me. 2020) (camps).
11Political opposition to the political party that favored restrictions appears to have motivated many of these challenges. But
some seem to be based on conflict between the legislature and the governor as to which branch has the power to decide,
regardless of political party. Alan Greenblatt, Political Power Plays: Tension Between the Legislative and Executive
Branches Escalates, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES MAGAZINE (Jan., 12 2021), https://www.ncsl.org/
bookstore/state-legislatures-magazine/tension-between-legislative-and-executive-branches-escalates-magazine2021.aspx.
12But see religion cases in Part E, infra.
13William Baude, Foreword: The Supreme Court’s Shadow Docket, 9 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 1, 3–5 (2015) (describing the
shadow docket as cases without full briefing or oral argument); Stephen Wermiel, On the Supreme Court’s Shadow Docket, the
Steady Volume of Pandemic Cases Continues, SCOTUSBLOG (Dec. 23, 2020), https://www.scotusblog.com/2020/12/on-the-
supreme-courts-shadow-docket-the-steady-volume-of-pandemic-cases-continues/.
14Compare MICHAEL SANDEL, DEMOCRACY’S DISCONTENT, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (2D ED. 1998); WITH
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971), JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993); ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER
VIRTUE (1984); MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE (1983); ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974);
FRIEDRICH VON HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY (1972).
15ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, THE CONSERVATIVE ASSAULT ON THE CONSTITUTION (2010); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY & HOWARD
GILLMAN, THE RELIGION CLAUSES: THE CASE FOR SEPARATING CHURCH AND STATE (2020), LAURENCE TRIBE, THE INVISIBLE
CONSTITUTION (2008), AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, VOL. ONE (3d ed. 2000).
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The Court has developed a specific standard of review for each right, although the details can shift
over time as the standard is refined in Court opinions involving the same right. It is common in
law schools in the United States to claim that when Justices decide which standard of review to
apply, they have effectively decided the outcome of a case. For this reason, the choice of the stan-
dard of review and its components are critical to defining both the content of any constitutionally
protected right and the scope of government authority to restrict that right.
The most important rights, often called fundamental, are generally reviewed with “strict scru-
tiny.” These include rights to free speech, free exercise of religion, voting, freedom of the press, free-
dom to assemble and petition government, freedom from bodily restraint and unreasonable search
and seizure, and freedom from discrimination on the basis of race, color, or national origin.16 The
term strict scrutiny expresses the fact that the Justices look very closely at how a law may infringe on
a fundamental right and for what purpose—they strictly scrutinize the law. Generally, to satisfy the
strict scrutiny standard, the government must have a “compelling interest” or purpose in enacting a
particular law that infringes the right, and the means that the law uses—specifically any restriction
on a fundamental right or what the law requires or forbids—must be necessary or narrowly tailored
so that the right is not restricted more than necessary to achieve the state’s compelling interest. There
are variations on how closely the means must fit the purpose, depending on which right is at issue.17
In this century, several Supreme Court decisions have expanded the scope and heightened the
importance of the right to the free exercise of religion18 and the right to freedom of speech,19
and imposed more stringent requirements on government to prove that its purposes cannot be
achieved some other way without infringing on those rights. In practice, it is exceedingly difficult
for government to justify laws that infringe on fundamental rights.
In contrast, rights that are not found by the Court to be very important—not fundamental to
democracy—receive “minimum scrutiny”, also called rationality review or the rational basis test.
These ordinary rights encompass almost all other rights that can be considered aspects of liberty,
such as owning property or operating a business. The Court has considered most social and eco-
nomic rights to be ordinary in this sense, contrary to the way they are understood in international
human rights law. The human right to health, for example, is not a right deemed protected by the
U.S. Constitution.20 Minimum scrutiny allows the state to enact laws that infringe on most rights
as long as the government has a “legitimate interest” or goal and the law is rationally related to that
16United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152, (1938). These are primarily the civil and political rights included in
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, United Nations, UN General Assembly Resolution 217A (III), U.N. GAOR, 3rd
Sess. 1st Plenary Meeting, U.N. Doc. A/810, Dec. 10, 1948, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A.
Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, UN Doc. A/6316; Dec. 16, 1966 No fundamental right is abso-
lute, but government must demonstrate a compelling reason to justify restriction, such as conviction of a crime to justify
incarceration. Supra, note 15. For examples related to health and safety, see generally WENDY K. MARINER ET AL., PUBLIC
HEALTH LAW, THIRD EDITION (2019).
17For example, there are several slightly different standards of review for different types of laws that affect speech. A law that
imposes a content-based restriction on freedom of speech, requiring or forbidding certain content in expression, must be
“narrowly tailored to achieve compelling state interests.” Reed v. Gilbert, Arizona, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015); Nat’l
Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018). In contrast, if content is not regulated, restrictions on
the time, place or manner of speech are permissible if they are narrowly tailored to achieve a significant government interest
and also leave the speaker ample alternative channels for communication. McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518 (2014). Laws
restricting speech in the form of advertising are subject to other variations. See e.g., Zauderer v. Off. of Disciplinary Counsel of
Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626 (1985) (upholding compelled disclosure of costs in attorney advertising); 44 Liquormart,
Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996) (striking down ban on advertising liquor prices).
18See, e.g., Masterpiece Cakeshop Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby
Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
19See, e.g., Janus v. American Fed’n of State, County, & Municipal Employees, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018); Nat’l Inst. of Family &
Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018); McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518 (2014); Sorrell v. IMSHealth Inc., 563 U.S.
552 (2011); Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
20Int’l Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights of its Twenty-First Session, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. GAOR,
Supp. No. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1996); General Comment 14, U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Sub-Comm. on
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goal. The law does not have to be necessary to achieve its goal, as long as the approach appears to
be a plausible way to serve the purpose and is not irrational. This is the standard of review most
often applicable to regulations governing commercial endeavors, from licensure requirements for
businesses and professions to rules for vehicular traffic. The standard allows government a great
deal of discretion. In practice, those challenging the law have the nearly impossible burden of
proving that the government’s goal is not legitimate or that the law is arbitrary or an irrational
way to achieve the goal. They rarely succeed.
Between these two general classifications is a smaller category of rights that are viewed as more
valuable than ordinary rights, but not fundamental, such as commercial advertising,21 freedom
from gender-based discrimination,22 and freedom from involuntary detention of a person with
mental illness who is likely to pose a danger to others.23 These are sometimes called important
rights and are reviewed with heightened or intermediate scrutiny, which generally demands that
government show an “important” purpose and that the means to achieve that purpose are sub-
stantially likely to achieve that purpose. In this arena, there is more variability, with the Supreme
Court heightening the demands for proof in proportion to its view of the importance of each
right.24
II. Theories of Judicial Review in Emergencies
A threshold question is whether there should be a different standard of review in emergencies,
and, if so, in all or just some types of emergencies. Before the coronavirus pandemic, most cases
and articles addressing emergency powers in the United States considered measures taken to pro-
tect national security, such as responses to the terrorist event on September 11, 2001.25 Responses
to local emergencies, like hurricanes and floods, generally enjoyed public support; indeed, the pub-
lic often demanded more assistance than was made available.26 During the SARS and Ebola pan-
demics, only a few cases were brought to court. They involved individuals who were involuntarily
quarantined or isolated by a state because officials believed they might be infected with the patho-
gen and likely to infect others.27 Courts deciding those cases did not consider that the state was
exercising emergency powers. Rather, courts applied the normal standard of review for depriva-
tions of an individual’s physical liberty based on preventing individuals from infecting others with
a contagious disease. That standard was a form of intermediate review, requiring the state to prove
both that the individual was infected—or at least exposed—and also likely to behave, voluntarily
or involuntarily, so as to infect other people.28
Econ., Soc., and Cultural Rights, Report on the Twenty-Second, Twenty-Third and Twenty-Fourth Sessions, U.N. Doc. E/2001/
22-E/C.12/2000/21, Annex IV, 8 (2001).
21Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
22Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
23Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992).
24The Court has occasionally applied a less deferential, more demanding standard than would be required under minimum
scrutiny, but without explicitly acknowledging that it is using a heightened form of scrutiny. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
25See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) (alien detainees entitled to habeas corpus under U.S. Constitution). See
generally ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, SECURITY, LIBERTY, AND THE COURTS; TERROR IN THE BALANCE (2007); OREN
GROSS & FIONNUALA NÍ AOLAÍN, LAW IN TIMES OF CRISIS: EMERGENCY POWERS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (2006); Wendy K.
Mariner, George J. Annas &Wendy E. Parmet, Pandemic Preparedness: A Return to the Rule of Law, 1 DREXEL L. REV. 341–82
(2009).
26See generally DOUGLAS BRINKLEY, THE GREAT DELUGE: HURRICANE KATRINA, NEW ORLEANS, AND THE MISSISSIPPI GULF
COAST (2006).
27SeeMichael R. Ulrich & Wendy K. Mariner, Quarantine and the Federal Role in Epidemics, 71 SMU L. REV. 391, 403–23
(2018) (describing constitutional standards for involuntary isolation of a person suspected of being infected with a contagious
disease).
28Id.; MARINER et al., PUBLIC HEALTH LAW, supra, note 16, at. 63–107.
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Until 2020, the judiciary had seen few challenges to broad measures like closing businesses and
restricting public gatherings imposed during the coronavirus pandemic.29 When business groups
that opposed these restrictions challenged a governors’ authority under emergency statutes, the
judiciary had almost no precedents to follow. Perhaps needing to respond quickly to urgent com-
plaints, some judges unearthed a 1905 case that few lawyers outside the health law field had read,
Jacobson v. Massachusetts.30 That case deserves some explanation, because its precedential rel-
evance became a subject of disagreement among judges reviewing COVID cases.
Henning Jacobson objected to a decision by the board of health of Cambridge, Massachusetts,
to require city residents—except children with medical contraindications—to be inoculated
against smallpox.31 A state law authorized the board to impose mandatory vaccination when “nec-
essary for the public health or safety.”32 The Supreme Court did not second guess the medical
decisions at issue. Instead, it noted that the state legislature acted reasonably in determining that
vaccination was a reasonable way to limit smallpox transmission and the board’s decision to act
was reasonable because smallpox was circulating in Cambridge.33 The Court recognized that the
constitution protected Jacobson’s liberty, but found that the state and city had sufficient justifi-
cation to override his right in those circumstances.34 As a result, Jacobson, who was deemed to be a
healthy adult, was convicted of noncompliance and fined five dollars.35
Jacobson is an awkward and probably inapt precedent for cases challenging COVID pandemic
mitigation measures. It was one of the first cases to reach the Supreme Court to challenge the
state’s power to limit the liberty of its own residents. The Supreme Court did not develop the
more precise, tiered standards of judicial review described above until decades after that 1905
case.36 Nonetheless, Jacobson is sometimes thought to express a rudimentary precursor to mini-
mum scrutiny, the most deferential standard of review.37 The Jacobson decision, however, did not
provide a clear principle or standard of review defining what must be proved to justify intruding
on the liberty to refuse vaccination.38 The opinion included several different phrases drawn from
pre-1900 cases involving very different legal issues: a law cannot be “unreasonable, arbitrary and
oppressive”; or have no “real or substantial relation” to public health, safety or morals; or be
“beyond all question, a plain, palpable invasion of rights secured by the fundamental law.”39
The second quoted phrase requires more justification from government than the Court’s current
minimum scrutiny does. The last quoted phrase is puzzling, because whether the law is an
29The United States had not experienced widespread disease from a pandemic since the mis-named Spanish Flu pandemic
of 1918. See generally JOHN M. BARRY, THE GREAT INFLUENZA: THE EPIC STORY OF THE DEADLIEST PLAGUE IN HISTORY
(2004).
30Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
31Henning Jacobson was apparently healthy adult who objected to vaccination because he had had a bad reaction in the
past. Id.
32MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 75, § 137.
33Vaccination was still rejected or feared by some groups of people at the time, but the Court found that the legislature, not
the judiciary, was the proper branch to weigh the merits of inoculation. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 30, 34–5.
34The Court added a caveat: “[T]he police power of a State, whether exercised by the legislature, or by a local body acting
under its authority, may be exerted in such circumstances or by regulations so arbitrary and oppressive in particular cases as to
justify the interference of the courts to prevent wrong and oppression,” and noted specifically its decision should not be read to
approve mandatory vaccination of individuals who have a medical condition that could be worsened by vaccination. Id. at 38.
35The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court had determined that the statute did not permit forced vaccination; it only
required those who failed to be vaccinated to pay a penalty of $5.00, about $142.00 in 2020 US dollars. Commonwealth
v. Pear, 66 N.E. 719, 722 (Mass. 1903).
36Wendy K. Mariner, George J. Annas & Leonard H. Glantz, Jacobson v. Massachusetts: It’s Not Your Great-Great
Grandfather’s Public Health Law, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 581 (2005).
37See, e.g., LAURENCE O. GOSTIN & LINDSAY F. WILEY, PUB. HEALTH L. 115–51 (3D ED. 2016).
38See generally Lindsey F. Wiley & Steve Vladeck, Coronavirus, Civil Liberties, and the Courts: The Case Against
“Suspending” Judicial Review, 133 HARV. L. REV. 179 (July 2020), https://harvardlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/
07/179-198_Online.pdf.
39Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 31.
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invasion of rights secured by the Constitution is the question presented to the court and not a
standard for answering that question. And Jacobson included a caution:
[A]n acknowledged power of a local community to protect itself against an epidemic threat-
ening the safety of all, might be exercised in particular circumstances and in reference to
particular persons in such an arbitrary, unreasonable manner, or might go so far beyond
what was reasonably required for the safety of the public, as to authorize or compel the courts
to interfere for the protection of such persons.40
The U.S. Supreme Court has cited Jacobson in several cases, mostly as a non-specific recognition of
state authority to protect health and safety, often in a string citation.41 Significantly, these cases
challenged ordinary laws; they did not involve emergencies.42 The only on-point use of Jacobson as
precedent was in a very brief 1922 opinion upholding a general statute mandating vaccination
against smallpox as a condition of school attendance.43 There was no emergency, the vaccination
requirement applied at all times, and the Court did not explain its reasoning. The most notorious
citation of Jacobson was as authority for upholding the state of Virginia’s law authorizing insti-
tutions to forcibly sterilize so-called “feebleminded” persons for “the public welfare” in the 1927
case of Buck v. Bell.44
Today, minimum scrutiny applies most often to laws regulating commercial entities. That
remained true in most cases that upheld the closure of businesses or restrictions on the number
of customers during the coronavirus pandemic.45 At the beginning of the COVID pandemic, most
early cases involving commercial and public gatherings did use Jacobson to support their deci-
sion.46 However, others found Jacobson inapplicable.47 Even applying ordinary modern standards
of review, courts typically upheld state measures to control the pandemic, at least in cases involv-
ing businesses and entertainment establishments.48
40Id. at 32.
41See, e.g., Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 356 (1997) (discussing civil commitment of sex offender); Hamilton v.
Regents of Univ. of Cal., 293 U.S. 245, 264 (1934) (denying religious exemption from military); Stephenson v. Binford,
287 U.S. 251, 272 (1932) (discussing the trucking context); United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 624 (1931) (no citizen-
ship for pacifist); Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 379 (1926) (zoning context); Thomas Cusack Co. v. City of
Chicago, 242 U.S. 526, 530 (1917); Plymouth Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 531, 542 (1914) (discussing coal mining
safety); Sturges & Burn Mfg. Co. v. Beauchamp, 231 U.S. 320, 325 (1913) (analyzing child labor law); Barnett v. Indiana,
229 U.S. 229 U.S. 26, 28 (1913) (mining context); Schmidinger v. City of Chicago, 226 U.S. 578, 582 (1913) (discussing weight
of bread); Collins v. Texas, 223 U.S. 288, 297 (1912) (analyzing medical licensure); German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Hale, 219 U.S.
307, 316 (1911) (insurance context); Welch v. Swazey, 214 U.S. 91, 105 (1909) (discussing building height).
42An exception—not related to public health—was Sterling v. Constantin, where the Court found no justification for the
Texas governor to declare an emergency and halt oil production in order to return oil prices to a decent level during the Great
Depression. See Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378, 389 (1932).
43Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174 (1922) (upholding mandatory smallpox vaccination as a condition of school attendance).
44Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927). The decision was also based on mistakes of fact. See generally Paul A. Lombardo, Three
Generations, No Imbeciles: New Light on Buck v. Bell, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 30 (1985). The decision has been superseded by later
cases protecting personal decisions about medical and reproductive care. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep’t of Health, 497
U.S. 261 (1990); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
45Wendy E. Parmet, Rediscovering Jacobson in the Era of COVID-19, 100 B.U. L. REV. 117 (2020).
46E.g., Page v. Cuomo, 478 F. Supp. 3d 355, 366 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 2020); League of Indep. Fitness Facilities & Trainers, Inc.
v. Whitmer, 814 Fed. Appx. 125 (6th Cir. 2020); Six v. Newsom, 462 F. Supp. 3d 1050 (C.D. Cal. 2020).
47See e.g., County of Butler v. Wolf, 456 F.Supp. 3d 883, 901 (W.D. Pa. 2020) (“ordinary constitutional scrutiny is necessary
to maintain the independent judiciary’s role as a guarantor of constitutional liberties—even in an emergency”); Bayley’s
Campground v. Mills, 463 F.Supp. 3d 22, 32 (D. Me May 29, 2020):
the permissive Jacobson rule floats about in the air as a rubber stamp for all but the most absurd and egregious restrictions
on constitutional liberties, free from the inconvenience of meaningful judicial review. This may help explain why the Supreme
Court established the traditional tiers of scrutiny in the course of the 100 years since Jacobson was decided.
48Desrosiers v. Governor, 486 Mass. 369, 386, fn. 25 (2020) (citing Jacobson, while noting “We agree that Jacobson does not
lead us to disregard constitutional scrutiny and defer completely to the executive’s orders. Instead, we determine the
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In cases involving more important rights, however, the picture is different. Judicial opinions
began to debate whether Jacobson should be considered a controlling precedent to give the state
maximum discretion in all emergencies. Because Jacobson was not a case about an emergency law,
relying on it to determine when the state can interfere with important personal rights suggests that
it could apply in ordinary circumstances. The next sections discuss that point.
D. Judicial Review of Access to Reproductive Care in Emergencies
Rights that may be diluted as a result of coronavirus pandemic cases are rights to make repro-
ductive decisions, especially the right to decide to have an abortion. Many state executive orders
required that non-essential or non-life-preserving businesses close, at least temporarily, during the
COVID epidemic. Few laws define essential services, so governors specified the types of businesses
that could stay open and those that had to close. In states where the state government is very
conservative, the executive orders classified reproductive health clinics as non-essential and
required them to close. In particular, they could not perform abortions. The reason given was
to preserve the limited supply of personal protective equipment (PPE) in the United States at
the beginning of the epidemic in March and April 2020. At the time, hospitals had trouble getting
enough PPE. Hospital departments and medical practices stopped seeing patients for routine and
elective services, although many shifted to telemedicine and virtual visits via computer platforms.
That was not an option for abortion services. Notably, in other states like Massachusetts, abortion
services, as well as emergency and critical care services, were deemed essential and allowed to
continue, with no apparent impact on PPE supply.
In 2020, two federal courts of appeal discovered the old Jacobson case and concluded that it
should control challenges to executive orders classifying reproductive health care as non-essential,
because the coronavirus pandemic was an emergency.49 The courts used the minimum level of
judicial review to uphold clinic closures, largely ignoring the Supreme Court’s quite specific stan-
dard that applies to laws limiting a woman’s right to abortion. About the same time, two different
federal courts of appeal rejected Jacobson as controlling precedent. They applied the normal stan-
dard of review and struck down executive orders that closed reproductive health facilities.50 These
conflicting opinions set the stage for reconsidering the extent to which a woman’s right to ter-
minate a pregnancy could be curtailed.
The U.S. Supreme Court first recognized the constitutional right of a woman to decide to have
an abortion in the 1973 case of Roe v. Wade.51 In Roe, it recognized the right as an aspect of liberty
protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments52 and described it as a fundamental right.
Thus, a form of strict scrutiny applied, requiring the state to demonstrate a compelling interest
in regulation and that a restriction is necessary to achieve that interest. The two accepted state
appropriate level of scrutiny and analyze the issues thereunder.”); Carmichael v. Ige, 470 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1144, 1147 (D. Haw.
2020) (applying Jacobson, but finding that the state’s 14-day quarantine order also survived strict scrutiny); Geller v. DeBlasio,
2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87405 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (applying intermediate scrutiny “through the lens” of Jacobson).
49In re Abbott, 956 F.3d 696 (5th Cir. 2020); In re Rutledge, 956 F.3d 1018 (8th Cir. 2020). The Fifth Circuit includes
Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas and has issued decisions generally favoring restrictions on access to abortion. The
Eighth Circuit includes Arkansas, Iowa, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, and South Dakota, and has issued
mixed decisions on that issue.
50Adams & Boyle, P.C. v. Slatery, 956 F.3d 913 (6th Cir. 2020), rehearing en banc denied, 956 F.3d 913 (2020); Robinson v.
Attorney General, 957 F.3d 1171 (11th Cir. 2020). The Sixth Circuit includes Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio, and Tennessee. The
Eleventh Circuit includes Alabama, Florida, and Georgia. Both are thought to lean conservative.
51Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
52U.S. CONST., amend XIV. “[n]o State shall : : : deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”“Substantive” due process requires government
to justify any law that limits a person’s liberty, regardless of how fair its enforcement procedures are, because a challenge to
such a law is a challenge to the substance of the law. RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE 608–29 (1999).
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goals were to protect the life of the woman and to protect the potential life of the foetus.53
Moreover, the Court found that the state’s interest in protecting the woman’s health only became
compelling after the first trimester, when the procedure’s risks to the woman became equal to or
greater than the risks from childbirth. The state’s interest in the potential life of the fetus only
became compelling at viability – when the fetus could feasibly live outside the womb, with or
without mechanical support. Even after viability, abortion could not be forbidden if it was neces-
sary to preserve the woman’s life or her physical, emotional, or family life health, because the state
still has an interest in protecting the woman’s health.54
There followed decades of state laws regulating providers of abortion services and imposing
conditions on women’s access to those services. Dozens of challenges to these laws reached
the Supreme Court, which responded by modifying the standard of review and, by implication,
the right itself.55 In 1992, in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, the Court
stopped referring to the right as fundamental.56 This slight shift allowed states to defend increas-
ingly restrictive laws with somewhat less demanding justifications. Casey also reformulated the
standard of review for abortion legislation. It allowed regulation that did not impose an “undue
burden” on the right:
An undue burden exists, and therefore a provision of law is invalid, if its purpose or effect is
to place a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus
attains viability : : : . Unnecessary health regulations that have the purpose or effect of pre-
senting a substantial obstacle to a woman seeking an abortion impose an undue burden on
the right.57
This formulation dispenses with the need for the state to demonstrate that the purpose of its regu-
lation must meet any specific degree of importance. It also avoids specifying how close the fit
must be between the regulation and its purpose. Yet the Court reaffirmed that “a state may
not prohibit any woman from making the ultimate decision to terminate her pregnancy before
viability.”58
In 2016, the Court appeared to give the Casey standard more teeth inWhole Woman’s Health v.
Hellerstedt.59 The state of Texas required physicians who performed abortions to have admitting
privileges at a hospital within thirty miles of their clinic.60 This was an impossible requirement to
meet. Hospitals almost never grant privileges to physicians who perform abortions, in part
because of controversy over abortion. More important, however, outpatient abortion complica-
tions are so rare that hospital admission is almost never needed, and hospitals are not inclined to
offer privileges to physicians who don’t admit patients to hospital. The Court found that this regu-
lation did not promote the state’s professed goal of protecting women’s health. Instead, it resulted
53Roe, 410 U.S. at 158 (“the word ‘person,’ as used in the Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the unborn” and there-
fore the fetus does not have constitutional rights).
54Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
55MARINER et al., PUB.HEALTH LAW, supra, note 27, at 355–84.
56Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
57Id. at 877. The state may not prohibit abortion before fetal viability and may only do so after viability if the regulation still
protects the life and health of the woman. Id. at 878.
58Id. at 877.
59Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2922 (2016).
60Physicians who are not hospital employees—which includes many private practices and virtually all abortion providers—
cannot admit patients to a hospital unless the hospital voluntarily grants them the privilege of admitting patients, typically on
the basis of their credentials, experience, the likelihood of sending their patients to that hospital, and the hospital’s need for
patients in that specialty. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, Hospital Admitting Privileges Mandates
Undermine Physician Practice and Unduly Burden Women’s Access to Abortion, undated, https://www.acog.org/news/
news-articles/2020/11/hospital-admitting-privilege-mandates-undermine-physician-practice-and-unduly-burden-womens-
access-to-abortion.
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in the closure of abortion providers in the state, thereby creating an unconstitutional undue bur-
den on the right.61 The Court held that Casey “requires that the courts consider the burdens a law
imposes on abortion access together with the benefits those laws confer.”62 This weighing of bur-
dens and benefits requires analyzing the facts. Laws that create obstacles without achieving
demonstrable benefits to women’s health are unnecessary and unconstitutional.
The Court upheld the Whole Woman’s Health formulation of the undue burden test in June
Medical Services v. Russo, a 2020 case striking down an almost identical law in Louisiana.63 The
majority emphasized that, to be constitutional, the benefits that the law produces must outweigh
the burdens that it places on access to abortion. However, the concurring and dissenting opinions
strongly suggested that the conservative Justices were rethinking just how fact-based the standard
should be. Indeed, there were at least five different views of how the standard should be inter-
preted and applied. Chief Justice Roberts, who had dissented inWhole Woman’s Health, provided
the fifth vote to strike down the Louisiana law, but only on the basis of stare decisis, because the
Texas and Louisiana laws were almost identical. In his concurrence, he found theWhole Woman’s
Health balancing of benefits and burdens inappropriate for the judiciary. Instead, he would focus
on whether a law creates a substantial obstacle. He would not require states to prove that restric-
tions on abortion would actually promote women’s health in fact. He wrote, “Laws that do not
pose a substantial obstacle to abortion access are permissible, so long as they are ‘reasonably
related’ to a legitimate state interest.”64 This describes the minimum scrutiny standard of review
for any law that imposes delays, costs, or conditions that are not seen as a “substantial obstacle.” It
also indicates that the right to decide to terminate a pregnancy should be considered merely an
ordinary right, not fundamental or even important.
Thus, the new majority of Justices who oppose abortion appear poised to continue to dilute
Roe’s standard of review. The cases challenging executive orders that closed or postponed abortion
services during the COVID pandemic offered the opportunity to do just that. The threshold ques-
tion in four key cases was what standard to use to review COVID closures of reproductive health
clinics. All four appellate court decisions were interlocutory, granting or denying a temporary
restraining order or writ of mandamus pending hearings on the merits. Nonetheless, such pro-
cedural decisions required deciding whether either party was likely to succeed on the merits,
thereby indicating the court’s probable future conclusion.65
In the case of In re Abbott, reproductive health centers challenged the Texas governor’s des-
ignation of their abortion services as “not immediately medically necessary,” requiring them to
close during the emergency in order to preserve PPE.66 The center argued that its services were
time sensitive and used minimal PPE, far less than the PPE needed for childbirth or surgery.67
61The Court also struck down a provision of the Texas law that required out-patient abortion facilities to comply with the
physical and staffing standards of an ambulatory surgical center. 136 S. Ct. at 2318. Like the privileges requirement, these
licensure standards were not necessary to protect women’s health and were sufficiently expensive and disruptive to drive
providers out of business. Id.
62Id. at 2309.
63June Medical Services v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103 (2020).
64Id. at 2135 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
65Litigants seeking a preliminary injunction against enforcement of a law typically must show: A strong likelihood of suc-
cess on the merits; the likelihood that they will suffer irreparable harm absent relief; opposing parties will not be harmed; and
an injunction is in the public interest. Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 425–26 (2009) (injunction); Winter v. National Resources
Defense Council, 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008) (injunction pending appeal); Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct. D.C., 542 U.S. 367, 380 (2004)
(writ of mandamus).
66In re Abbott, 954 F.3d 772 (5th Cir. 2020) (Abbot II) (granting writ of mandamus vacating lower court’s temporary
restraining order that halted executive order); 956 F.3d 696 (5th Cir. 2020) (Abbott V) (granting new writ of mandamus after
remand).
67See American College of Obstetrics & Gynecology, Joint Statement on Abortion Access During the COVID-19 Outbreak
(Mar. 18, 2020); https://www.acog.org/news/news-releases/2020/03/joint-statement-on-abortion-access-during-the-covid-19-
outbreak. Timely access was important because Texas law banned procedural abortion after 22 weeks of pregnancy, with few
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Moreover, closing abortion services would actually increase the risk of COVID transmission,
because women would travel to open sites in other states to obtain timely abortions. Closing
the services would undermine, rather than help, the state’s goal. Under Casey’s principles, the
order offered no benefit, but instead imposed a significant burden on the right to terminate
pregnancies.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected that argument. It held that Jacobson established
“the framework governing emergency exercises of state authority during a public health crisis.”68
The conclusion that Jacobson governed all emergency measures was a dramatic departure from
precedent; Jacobson had not previously been viewed as an emergency case. The court paid lip
service to Casey andWhole Woman’s Health, but quoted phrases from Jacobson to craft a standard
of review like minimum scrutiny.69 It held, “A court should ‘ask[ ] whether [the order] imposes
burdens on abortion that ‘beyond question’ exceed its benefits in combating the epidemic.”70 That
demands that challengers produce a much higher level of proof than Whole Woman’s Health
required. Finding that the order was merely temporary, the court concluded that courts may
ask only whether the state has acted in an “arbitrary, unreasonable manner.”71 The court’s for-
mulation gives the state the widest discretion, regardless of the importance of the right: “Jacobson
instructs that all constitutional rights may be reasonably restricted to combat a public health emer-
gency.”72 It sustained the closures pending a hearing on the merits. The Eighth Circuit Court Of
Appeals, in In re Rutledge, quickly adopted the reasoning of In re Abbott and, applying Jacobson,
allowed Arkansas’s emergency ban on abortion services to remain in effect.73
Two other federal appellate courts came to the opposite conclusion. They upheld preliminary
injunctions against emergency bans on abortion procedures during the COVID-19 pandemic.
One day after the Rutledge decision, the Federal Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in
Robinson v. Attorney General found that Jacobson’s “ruling was not a blank check for the exercise
of governmental power.”74 The court approved the Casey standard to assess whether against
Alabama’s emergency ban on abortion procedures would impose an undue burden on women’s
rights. Finding that it likely would, the court allowed a preliminary injunction to remain in effect
pending appeal.75
exceptions, Tex. Health & Safety Code §§ 171.044, 171.042, and also banned medication abortion after 10 weeks of pregnancy,
Tex. Health & Safety Code § 171.063(a)(2).
68Abbott II, 754 F.3d at 783; Abbott V, 756 F.3d at 710.
69Abbott V, 956 F.3d at 705, quoting Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 31,
[W]hen faced with a society-threatening epidemic, a state may implement emergency measures that curtail constitutional
rights so long as the measures have at least some ‘real or substantial relation’ to the public health crisis and are not
‘beyond all question, a plain and palpable invasion of rights secured by the fundamental law’;
Abbott II, 954 F.3d at 783, quoting Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 29,
in every well-ordered society charged with the duty of conserving the safety of its members the rights of the individual in
respect of his liberty may at time, under the pressure of great dangers, be subjected to such restraint, to be enforced by
reasonable regulations, as the safety of the general public may demand.
Judge James Dennis dissented, arguing that the district court did not abuse its discretion in issuing the TRO, and that the
majority treated abortion services differently without justification, second guessed the trial court’s evaluation of the evidence,
and improperly granted the extraordinary remedy of mandamus. Abbott V, 956 F.3d. at 724-739 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
70Abbott V, 956 F.3d at 705 (quoting Abbott II, 954 F.3d at 784).
71Abbott V, 956 F.3d at 734 (quoting Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 28). See also Abbott II, 954 F.3d at 784 (“Jacobson disclaimed any
judicial power to second-guess the state’s policy choices in crafting emergency public health measures”).
72Abbott II, 954 F.3d at 786.
73In re Rutledge, 946 F.3d 1018, 1027–28 (8th Cir. 2020) (granting writ of mandamus dissolving a temporary restraining
order that had halted enforcement of the ban on procedural abortions in Arkansas, characterizing them as elective or non-
emergency procedures).
74Robinson v. Attorney General, 957 F.3d 1171, 1179 (11th Cir. 2020) (“[J]ust as constitutional rights have limits, so too
does a state’s power to issue executive orders limiting such rights in times of emergency.”).
75Id. at 1181.
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The Federal Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit explained its similar conclusion in more
detail in Adams & Boyle v. Slatery, a challenge by reproductive health clinics to the Tennessee
governor’s emergency ban on abortion procedures.76 As in all these cases, the state’s goal was
to preserve PPE and prevent community spread of COVID. Tennessee argued that Jacobson
should control the decision and allow the ban to stand.77 The court stressed the difficulty of apply-
ing Jacobson to the dramatically different facts before it. It concluded that even if Jacobson is
accepted “at face value,” a woman’s right to a pre-viability abortion is part of “the fundamental
law.” After all, the court noted, ordinarily the governor’s order would be an unconstitutional ban
on abortion, even if time-limited. The order “that would prevent a woman from exercising her
right in-state altogether, or would require her to undergo a more invasive and costlier procedures
than she otherwise would have[—]constitutes ‘beyond question, a plain, palpable invasion of
rights secured by [that] fundamental law.’”78 Although the court recognized that “abortion rights
during a public health crisis” may not necessarily be “identical to rights during normal times,” it
“will not countenance : : : the notion that COVID-19 has somehow demoted Roe and Casey to
second-class rights, enforceable against only the most extreme and outlandish violations.”79
Immediately after the Abbott V decision, Texas Governor Abbott ended his executive order.
Then, on January 25, 2021, in a three sentence per curiam decision without opinion, the U.S.
Supreme Court granted certiorari in the Texas case, vacated the Abbot V judgment below, and
remanded to the Fifth Circuit with instructions to dismiss the case as moot.80 It did the same
with Slatery for the same reason.
The absence of a U.S. Supreme Court decision on the merits leaves lower courts struggling with
how to analyze similar cases. Some courts have concluded that the vacated decisions in Abbott and
Rutledge cannot be used precedents.81 But others have continued to use Jacobson as a general
framework for emergencies.82
It seems possible that the judges who allowed the closure of clinics used the COVID epidemic
to dilute the importance of the right to make reproductive decisions. These appellate judges used a
form of minimum scrutiny as the standard of review and did not require government to prove that
closing clinics would preserve any PPE or prevent the spread of COVID. They and lower courts
judges often used facts selectively, ignoring medical evidence and emphasizing the temporary
nature of closures. Because abortion is a time sensitive procedure, however, such limits effectively
prohibit many women from exercising their right to obtain an abortion. Keeping clinics closed
during an emergency has the same effect on women as prohibiting abortion services in non-
emergency.
76956 F.3d 913 (6th Cir. 2020) (denying the state’s appeal of the district court preliminary injunction against executive
order).
77Id. at 918 (noting the state’s characterization of abortions as “surgical and invasive procedures that are elective and non-
urgent”).
78Id. at 926 (quoting Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 31).
79Id. at 927.
80Planned Parenthood Center for Choice v. Abbott, 141 S.Ct. 1261 (2021) (citing United States v. Munsingwear, Inc. 349
U.S. 36 (1950)). The Supreme Court is not required to hear appeals except in specific types of cases, and these did not fall into
that category. Moreover, because the orders were no longer in effect, the challengers were no longer subject to their
restrictions.
81Forbes v. County of San Diego, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41687, 2021 WL 843175 (S.D. Cal. 2021); New Orleans Catering,
Inc. v. Cantrell, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38516, 2021 WL 795979 (2021); Grisham v. Romero, 2021 N.M.LEXIS 3, 2021 WL
608790 (N.M. 2021); Let Them Play Mn v. Walz, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23485, 2021 WL 423923 (D. Minn. 2021).
82See, e.g., Big Tyme Investments v. Edwards, 985 F.3d 456 (5th Cir. 2021); Sanchez v. Brown, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90667
(N.D. Tex. 2020).
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E. Judicial Review of Religious Freedom in Emergencies
The second example of altering standards of review concerns religious objections to public health
measures. Emergency orders by state governors banned or limited the number of people who are
allowed to attend public gatherings in person during the COVID epidemic. Places of worship were
often included. They present particular risks, because people from different households typically
gather close together for a prolonged periods, usually an hour or more, praying and singing, tradi-
tionally without masks.83 Multiple outbreaks of infection have been traced to churches.84 Some
religious institutions—mostly Christian churches—challenged their state’s executive orders,
claiming that limits on in-person attendance at church services violated their right to exercise
their religion, which is protected by the First Amendment of US Constitution.85 Many lower court
decisions held that the limits on attendance were entirely justified on the basis of scientific facts
about coronavirus transmission.86 Ultimately, three cases reached the United States
Supreme Court.
The standard of review that the United States Supreme Court had applied to laws that have a
secular purpose, but may affect religious practices, has been the relatively deferential minimum
scrutiny.87 A law that is “neutral and generally applicable” is justifiable as long as the state has a
legitimate purpose and the law’s requirements or prohibitions are “rationally related” to furthering
that purpose.88 A law is neutral toward religion when it does not single out religion for disfavored
treatment or burdens.89 It is generally applicable when it applies to the general population or sim-
ilarly situated entities that are not religious.90 Such a law is constitutional even if it inconveniences
religious practices. Classic examples include public health laws, such as mandatory vaccinations.91
In contrast, laws that are not neutral or that target religion for particular burdens are reviewed
using strict scrutiny.92
Recently, however, a new conservative majority of Justices issued decisions that characterized
generally applicable laws as not neutral toward religion. The opinions suggested that these Justices
were privileging religious beliefs over general laws intended to protect public welfare, such as laws
83Brief of American Medical Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent, Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn
v. Cuomo (2020) (No. 20A87), https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/20/20A87/161064/20201118104326342_
20A87acAmericanMedicalAssociationAndMedicalSocietyOfTheStateOfNewYork.pdf, (summarizing evidence).
84Brenda Gregorio-Nieto & NBC 7 Staff, Health Officials Alert Public Over 2 Additional Outbreaks at Awaken Church
Locations, NBC SAN DIEGO, (Dec. 3, 2020), https://www.nbcsandiego.com/news/local/health-officials-alert-public-over-2-
additional-outbreaks-at-awaken-church-locations/2460223/?amp; Kate Conger, Jack Healy & Lucy Thompkins, Churches
Were Eager to Reopen. Now They Are Confronting Coronavirus Cases, NEW YORK TIMES (July 8, 2020), https://www.
nytimes.com/2020/07/08/us/coronavirus-churches-outbreaks.html; CDC, High COVID-19 Attack Rate Among Attendees at
Events at a Church – Arkansas, March 2020, MORBIDITY & MORTALITY REPORT 632, 69(20) (May 22, 2020), https://www.
cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/69/wr/mm6920e2.htm.
85SeeU.S. CONST., amend I. (stating “Congress shall make no law respecting the establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to
petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”)
86See, e.g., Robinson v. Murphy, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 185070, 2020 WL 5884801 (D.N.J. 2020) (denied TRO against N.J.
restrictions on worshipers because same rules applied to similar secular gatherings), vacated, 141 S.Ct. 972 2020), remanded for
reconsideration in light of Roman Catholic Diocese); South Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 494 F. Supp. 3d 785
(S.D. Cal. 2020) (citing Jacobson), vacated and remanded, 141 S. Ct. 716 (2021).
87Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166–67 (1944) (citing Jacobson stating, “[a parent] cannot claim freedom from
compulsory vaccination for the child more than for himself on religious grounds. The right to practice religion freely does not
include liberty to expose the community or the child to communicable disease or the latter to ill health or death.”).
88Unemployment Div., Dep’t Hum. Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
89Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993); Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018).
90Unemployment Division, supra, note 88.
91Phillips v. City of New York, 775 F.3d 538 (2d Cir. 2015), reh. and reh. en banc denied (2015), cert. den. 136 S. Ct. 104
(2015); Brown v. Stone, 378 So.2d 218 (Miss. 1979); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
92See MARINER et al., PUBLIC HEALTH LAW, supra, note 16, at 492–533.
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prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race, color, sex, or disability,93 and laws requiring health
insurance to cover contraceptives.94 The challenges to COVID restrictions gave these Justices an
opportunity to strengthen protection of religious beliefs, although not without resistance from
their fellow Justices. Most cases involved whether to grant or deny an injunction or a stay of a
lower court decision pending review on the merits. The Justices do not often explain their rea-
soning in procedural matters. But in these cases, they made their views clear in concurring and
dissenting opinions.
The contrasting views first appeared in South Bay Pentecostal United Church v. Newsom (South
Bay I).95 There, Chief Justice Roberts wrote a brief concurrence agreeing with the per curiam deci-
sion not to stay enforcement of a California executive order limiting religious and other non-
essential services during the pandemic. He said, our Constitution principally entrusts “[t]he safety
and the health of the people” to the politically accountable officials of the States “to guard and
protect,” and they must have “especially broad” latitude, particularly where pandemics are
“dynamic and fact-intensive.”96 Notably, he cited Jacobson v. Massachusetts. Three Justices dis-
agreed. Justice Kavanaugh wrote a dissent, joined by Justices Thomas and Gorsuch, arguing that
claims of violations of religious freedom must be judged using the strict scrutiny standard.97 He
and Roberts chose different comparators for assessing discrimination. Kavanaugh claimed that
worship services were limited to the lower of one hundred people, or twenty-five percent of
the building’s seating capacity, while secular businesses like retail stores and restaurants were
not, and therefore California’s guidelines discriminated against places of worship. Roberts wrote
that religions were treated the same or better than “comparable secular gatherings, including lec-
tures, concerts, movie showing, spectator sports, and theatrical performances, where large groups
of people gather in close proximity for extended periods of time.”98 He characterized grocery
stores, banks, and laundromats as dissimilar.
The same split appeared in a similar case from Nevada, Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley v.
Sisolak, which denied an injunction against a Nevada order limiting worship attendance to fifty
persons.99 Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh dissented. Justice Alito’s dissent,
joined by Justices Thomas and Kavanaugh, pointed out that casinos, bowling alleys, breweries,
and fitness facilities may operate at fifty percent capacity.100 In response to the state’s argument
that its orders should be upheld under Jacobson, Justice Alito wrote:
It is a mistake to take language in Jacobson as the last word on what the Constitution allows
public officials to do during the COVID-19 pandemic. Language in Jacobsonmust be read in
context, and it is important to keep in mind that Jacobson primarily involved a substantive
due process challenge to a local ordinance requiring residents to be vaccinated for small pox.
It is a considerable stretch to read the decision as establishing the test to be applied when
statewide measures of indefinite duration are challenged under the First Amendment or
other provisions not at issue in that case.101
Justice Kavanaugh went further, saying, “There are certain constitutional red lines that a State may
not cross even in a crisis. Those red lines include racial discrimination, religious discrimination,
93Masterpiece Cakeshop Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rts. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018).
94Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (applying the federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act
instead of the First Amendment); Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557, 1558–58 (2016) (same).
95South Bay United Pentacostal v. Newsom, 140 S. Ct. 1613 (2020) (per curiam)
96Id. at 1613 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
97Id. at 1613 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
98Id. at 1613 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
99Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley v. Sisolak, 140 S. Ct. 2603 (2020) (denying injunction).
100Id. at 2605 (Alito, J., dissenting).
101Id. at 2608 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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and content-based suppression of speech.”102 In his view, when a state creates categories that favor
some but not other similar entities, it must place religious entities in the favored category, granting
religion something like a “most favored nation status,” absent a compelling reason to do
otherwise.103
The four dissenting Justices in Calvary Chapel appeared to redefine and increase the impor-
tance of the constitutional right to religious freedom.104 In their view, claims of violations of dis-
crimination against religion should normally be subject to strict scrutiny whenever religion is
limited more than some secular entities, even when the law does not target religion, even when
there are good reasons for different treatment, and even in an emergency. Their view became the
majority after Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg died on September 18, 2020,105 and Amy Coney
Barrett became the ninth Justice on October 26, 2020.106
Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo107 confirmed that a new majority of Justices
would apply strict scrutiny to claims of religious freedom. That case considered two challenges
to New York Governor Andrew Cuomo’s executive order that imposed different limits on the
number of people who could gather in person for non-essential purposes, based on the number
of COVID cases in each area or zone of the state. The Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn and
Agudath Israel of America argued that limits of ten persons in red zones and twenty-five persons
in orange zones violated their religious freedom.108 The executive order did not single out religious
groups for special treatment, but also did not include them in the state’s list of “essential” busi-
nesses or services. A majority of the Justices agreed that labeling religious services non-essential
treated religion differently from other similar activities and was not neutral toward religion.109
Therefore, they concluded, strict scrutiny was the standard of review. While the state’s interest
in controlling the pandemic was “unquestionably a compelling interest,” the majority held that
the regulations were not “narrowly tailored” to prevent the spread of COVID.110 In particular, the
majority found that limiting church attendance to ten or twenty-five people was inconsistent with
allowing hundreds of people to shop in grocery or other stores. It thus enjoined enforcement of the
order pending resolution of the case on its merits. But by deciding that the strict scrutiny standard
of review that applied, the ultimate outcome was preordained.111
The South Bay case (South Bay II) returned to the Supreme Court in 2021, after California
Governor Newsom reimposed limits in light of a surge in COVID cases.112 Indoor attendance
at worship services, restaurants, and move theaters were limited to the lesser of twenty-five percent
102Id. at 2614–15 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
103Id. at 2612 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
104Id. at 2610 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (laying out four categories of laws affecting religion and his view of the corre-
sponding standards of review).
105Supreme Court of the United States, Press Release (Sept. 18, 2020), https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/press/
pressreleases/pr_09-18-20.
106Barbara Sprunt, Amy Coney Barrett Confirmed to Supreme Court, Takes Constitutional Oath, NPR (Oct. 26, 2020),
https://www.npr.org/2020/10/26/927640619/senate-confirms-amy-coney-barrett-to-the-supreme-court.
107Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63 (2020) (per curiam) (consolidated with Agudath Israel of
America v. Cuomo granting injunction against enforcement of New York executive order pending disposition of an appeal in
federal court of appeals).
108The Roman Catholic Diocese churches each seated at least 500 people, and two seated over 1,000. Id. at 67.
109The court showed considerable sympathy with the belief that Catholic and Orthodox Jewish faiths required attending
worship in person, even though other religious groups were streaming services online. Id. at 68
110Id. at 67.
111Lower court decisions upholding restrictions on worship attendance were vacated and remanded with instructions to
reconsider in light of Roman Catholic Diocese. See, e.g., Robinson v. Murphy, 141 S. Ct. 972 (2020) (remanded for recon-
sideration in light of Roman Catholic Diocese).
112South Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom (South Bay II), 141 S. Ct. 716 (2021). See also Gateway City Church v.
Newsom, 141 S. Ct. 1460 (2021) (per curiam) (denying injunctive relief based on South Bay II); Harvest Rock Church, Inc. v.
Newsom, 141 S. Ct. 1289 (2021) (per curiam) (enjoining ban on indoor worship in Tier 1 high risk COVID areas).
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of building capacity or one-hundred persons.113 In a one-paragraph per curiam decision, the
Court enjoined enforcement of the indoor limits on worship—except the twenty-five percent
capacity limit—pending resolution of the merits of the case in the lower court.114 It allowed
enforcement of the ban on singing indoors. Importantly, all Justices agreed that the state has a
compelling interest in reducing the risk of coronavirus infection. Chief Justice Roberts, concur-
ring, reiterated his position that “federal courts owe significant deference to politically accountable
officials.”115 But this time he was unwilling to defer to their judgment that a complete ban on
indoor worship was necessary. The South Bay cathedral, with room for 1,000 people, was large
enough to safely accommodate more than one-hundred worshippers. “Deference, though broad,
has its limits,” he concluded.116 Justice Gorsuch would enjoin all the restrictions, indicating that
even “subtle departures from neutrality” toward religion trigger strict scrutiny.117
Justice Kagan dissented, joined by Justices Breyer and Sotomayor. Notably, she did not rely on
Jacobson or any emergency standard of review. Instead, she argued that the other Justices were
comparing apples and oranges: “The ‘Constitution does not require things which are different in
fact : : : to be treated in law as though they were the same.’”118 By treating “worship services like
secular services that pose a much lesser danger,” such as running in and out of a hardware store,
she wrote, the Court’s decision “defies our case law, exceeds our judicial role, and risks worsening
the pandemic.”119 The majority was not insisting on neutrality toward religion, in her opinion, but
favoring religion at the expense of scientific expertise and public health.
The Justices hardened their positions when considering yet another modified executive order
from California in Tandon v. Newsom.120 Governor Gavin Newsom’s order limited all religious
and secular gatherings inside homes to members of no more than three households. The lower
courts denied an injunction sought by pastors who wished to host bible study groups and worship
at home.121 The Supreme Court reversed and granted the temporary injunction in a four page per
curiam decision, with the same three Justices dissenting.122 That opinion concluded that the state
failed to prove that requiring home worship events to use precautions like those required for retail
and entertainment venues would not suffice to prevent the spread of COVID. Thus, the order was
not narrowly tailored to avoid unnecessary restrictions on religion and failed the strict scru-
tiny test.
Despite the obvious disagreement among the Justices over the standard of review in prior cases,
the per curiam opinion asserted that the Court’s decisions have made three points clear:
First, government regulations “trigger strict scrutiny under the Free Exercise Clause, when-
ever they treat any comparable secular activity more favorably than religious exercise : : : .
Second, whether two activities are comparable for purposes of the Free Exercise clause must
be judged against the asserted government interest that justifies the regulation at issue : : : .
113The rules prohibited indoor attendance at bars, concerts, sporting events, family entertainment centers, and theaters,
while retail stores, except grocers, were limited to fifty percent capacity. South Bay United Pentecostal Church v.
Newsom, 494 F. Supp. 3d 785 (S.D.Cal. 2020).
114The prohibition applied to all public gatherings, but only in areas of the state with the highest rates of coronavirus infec-
tion. People were permitted to gather outdoors in California’s mild climate. Thus, the crowd size, but not the activity, was
limited in those areas. South Bay II, 141 S. Ct. at 721 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
115Id. at 716 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
116Id. at 717.
117Id. at 717 (Gorsuch, J., statement, joined by Thomas and Alito).
118Id. at 720 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
119Id. at 720.
120Tandon v. Newsom, 141 S. Ct. 1294, 209 L. Ed. 2d 355, 359 (2021) (“This is the fifth time the Court has summarily
rejected the Ninth Circuit’s analysis of California’s COVID restrictions on religious exercise.”).
121Tandon v. Newson, 992 F.3d 916 (9th Cir. 2021).
122Tandon, 209 L. Ed. 2d at 359 (Justice Kagan, J., joined by Justices Breyer and Sotomayor, dissent for the reasons stated in
South Bay II).
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Third, : : : . narrow tailoring requires the government to show that measures less restrictive of
the First Amendment activity could not address its interest in reducing the spread of COVID.
Where the government permits other activities to proceed with precautions, it must show
that the religious exercise at issue if more dangerous than those activities even when the same
precautions are applied : : : . Otherwise, precautions that suffice for other activities suffice for
religious exercise too.”123
Chief Justice Roberts reported, without opinion, that he would deny the injunction. Justice Kagan,
joined by Justices Breyer and Sotomayor, would also deny the injunction. Reprising her dissent in
South Bay II, Justice Kagan wrote that the executive order limited all in-home gatherings, whether
secular or religious, to three households, properly treating like things alike.124 By comparing home
worship with hardware stores and nail salons, she said, the majority improperly treated
unlike things the same. Worse, she wrote, the Court “once more commands California ‘to ignore
its experts’ scientific findings,’ thus impairing ‘the State’s effort to address a public health
emergency.’”125
These decisions suggest that a majority of current Supreme Court Justices may have used the
coronavirus cases as an opportunity to redefine the standard of review to afford religious rights
increased protection from government regulation. The changes are subtle. First, they found that
an otherwise generally applicable law was not neutral toward religion if the law imposed fewer
restrictions on “any comparable secular activity.” The key to finding a lack of neutrality lay in
the choice of which secular activities the Justices considered comparable. Different treatment
of religion can be reasonable or unreasonable, depending upon whether the facts justify different
treatment. In these cases, the Justices appeared to ignore facts in the record about COVID trans-
mission in retail and religious activities. Instead, they relied on their own assumptions about the
risk of infection to find similarities and differences.
F. Implications for Judicial Review in Non-Emergencies
The five Justices who consistently voted to enjoin restrictions on religious worship attendance
appear to privilege religious freedom over other rights affected by public health restrictions.
This new majority of Justices also appears to believe that the standard of review during the pan-
demic is the same standard that applies during ordinary circumstances, as seen in their choice of
strict scrutiny as the applicable standard.126 A pandemic may give government a compelling inter-
est in preventing the spread of disease, but any limits on religious activities must be narrowly
tailored to advance that interest while infringing on the right as little as possible.127 Justice
Gorsuch wrote, “Even in times of crisis—perhaps especially in times of crisis—we have a duty
to hold governments to the Constitution.”128 In other words, there is no emergency standard
of review, at least for religious claims.
In contrast, two appellate courts in cases involving reproductive health care clinics did con-
clude that Jacobson established a general standard of review or “framework” for emergencies.
123141 S. Ct. at1296-1297, 209 L. Ed. 2d at 357–58.
124South Bay II, 141 S. Ct. at 1298, 209 L. Ed. 2d at 360 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
125Id. at 360.
126See Calvary Chapel, 140 S. Ct. at 2604 (Alito, J., dissenting, joined by Thomas and Kavanaugh) (“The problem is no
longer one of exigency, but one of considered yet discriminatory treatment of places of worship.”); 140 S. Ct. at 2609
(Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“The world we inhabit today, with a pandemic upon us, poses unusual challenges. But there is
no world in which the Constitution permits Nevada to favor Caesars Palace over Calvary Chapel.”).
127See text accompanying supra, notes 97, 117, and 122.
128South Bay II, 141 S. Ct. at 718 (Gorsuch, J., statement joined by Thomas and Alito).
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Because the Supreme Court vacated all four appellate court decisions in the reproductive rights
cases, whether or not they relied on Jacobson, without any opinion explaining its reasons, it
remains unclear whether the Supreme Court would adopt an emergency standard of review just
for reproductive rights. It seems more likely that the new majority of Justices would simply lower
the level of scrutiny for laws restricting the right to make reproductive decisions, effectively rel-
egating that right to a lesser status, with or without an emergency.129
Four indicators suggest that the Court may be using these COVID cases as vehicles to initiate
changes in the ordinary standard of judicial review beyond emergencies. First, the new majority of
Justices distinguished the right to religious freedom under the First Amendment from substantive
due process rights based on the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, which include
the right to terminate a pregnancy. Justice Gorsuch, concurring, wrote, “Government is not free to
disregard the First Amendment in times of crisis.”130 Justice Kavanaugh posited three “red lines
that a State may not cross even in an emergency.”131 Notably, he did not include Fourteenth
Amendment substantive due process rights. Instead, he argued that “courts should be extremely
deferential to the States when considering a substantive due process claim by a secular business
that it is being treated worse than another business” and cited Jacobson.132 Jacobson decided a
substantive due process liberty claim. This suggests that at least four Justices would not necessarily
apply the ordinary standard from Casey and Whole Woman’s Health during an emergency.133
However, because they appear to apply the ordinary standard in cases involving other rights, they
may be signaling a change in the ordinary standard for abortion cases, one that would be more
deferential to the state and less protective of a woman’s right.
Second, the majority indicated that even temporary restrictions on religious freedom during a
pandemic inflicted a cognizable injury on worshippers. One requirement for litigants seeking a
preliminary injunction is to demonstrate that they would be subjected to “irreparable injury”
if the challenged order were not enjoined pending litigation on the merits.134 In Roman
Catholic Diocese, the majority wrote, “‘The loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal
periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.’”135 This contrasts with the now
vacated Abbott V decision, which made no mention of the possibility that the loss of a
Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process right could constitute irreparable injury. The
lack of access to abortion services, even for a week or so, can extend pregnancy beyond the time
within which abortions are legal under state law. Abortion delayed often means abortion denied,
which is denial of the right. Moreover, women who traveled out of state for abortion services faced
the risk of contracting COVID, itself a clear injury.
Third, the Justices opinions suggest that a majority will see unconstitutional discrimination
against religion in many laws that would have been upheld as neutral and generally applicable
in the past. They found discrimination against religion in facially neutral COVID orders by select-
ing particular activities and rejecting others for comparison with worship services. For example,
California’s executive order in Tandon was facially neutral; it limited all in-home gatherings to
129On May 17, 2021, the Court agreed to review a non-emergency Mississippi law prohibiting pre-viability abortions after
15 weeks—except health emergencies and fetal abnormalities—that a federal appeals court held unconstitutional under cur-
rent law in Dobbs v. JacksonWomen’s Health Org., 945 F.3d 265 (5th Cir. 2019). Amy Howe, Court to Weigh in on Mississippi
Abortion Ban Intended to Challenge Roe v. Wade, SCOTUSBLOG (May 17, 2021), https://www.scotusblog.com/2021/05/court-
to-weigh-in-on-mississippi-abortion-ban-intended-to-challenge-roe-v-wade/.
130Roman Catholic Diocese, 141 S. Ct. at 69 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
131See text accompanying supra, note 102.
132Calvary Chapel, 140 S. Ct. at 2614 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
133See text accompanying supra, notes 63 and 64.
134Supra, note 65.
135Roman Catholic Diocese, 141 S. Ct. at 68 (quoting Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976)).
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three households. The majority instead compared in-home religious gatherings not to in-home
political and social gatherings, but to shopping in commercial buildings. They concluded that
in-home religious gatherings suffered from discrimination, because some retail businesses could
accept a large number of people who went in and out.136 This allowed them to conclude that the
order was not neutral, but discriminated against religion, which required strict scrutiny. As Justice
Kagan wrote in Tandon, “the per curiam’s analysis of this case defies the factual record.”137 In
South Bay II, she wrote that the majority “insists on treating unlike cases, not like ones,
equivalently.”138
Finally, the Justices appear inconsistent in their demands of the litigants, complaining that
states had not provided enough evidence of the need for restrictions on religion, while speculating
about the likelihood of transmission in religious and secular activities.139 To be sure, there were
instances of states unadvisedly allowing economically powerful industries to open with larger
capacities than religious gatherings. The best example is that of casinos in Nevada.140
However, equating worship services with banks and grocery stores seems inaccurate and disin-
genuous. In the reproductive clinic cases, courts varied in their reliance on the factual record.
Abbott V and In re Rutledge accepted the states’ arguments that the clinics could jeopardize
the PPE supply, while rejecting or ignoring the evidence that clinic closures would harm women,
depriving many, if not most, of their access to abortion. On the other hand, Slatery and Robinson
took the evidence of harm more seriously and issued a preliminary injunction against clinic clo-
sures. If the Court uses facts to decide whether a constitutional right is violated, it should get the
facts right, especially in an emergency when lives may be at stake.141 If facts can be misperceived or
manipulated to achieve a preferred outcome, the integrity of judicial review is at risk.
G. Conclusion
U.S. Supreme Court decisions in the above cases illustrate the potential for emergencies to alter
protection for human rights indefinitely. There are good reasons why emergencies should not
suspend ordinary judicial review, as Wiley and Vladeck explain, especially in an extended crisis.142
The idea of suspending the rules may appeal in a short-term crisis, such as a hurricane or explo-
sion.143 In long lasting emergencies, however, exceptions can settle into daily life and become
the rule.
136Tandon, 992 F.3d at 925, noting that even if religious gatherings in homes were compared to small businesses, those
businesses were also subject to extensive requirements for cleaning, ventilation, and mask wearing.
137Tandon, 209 L. Ed. 2d at 360 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
138Pentecoastal Church, 141 S. Ct. at 722 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
139141 S. Ct. at 723 (Kagan, J., joined by Breyer and Sotomayor dissenting) (“In the worst public health crisis in a century,
this foray into armchair epidemiology cannot end well.”); Roman Catholic Diocese, 141 S. Ct. at 79 (Sotomayor, J., joined by
Kagan, dissenting) (“Justices of this Court play a deadly game in second guessing the expert judgment of health officials about
the environments in which a contagious virus, now infecting a million Americans each week, spreads most easily.”).
140Calvary Chapel, 140 S. Ct. at 2613 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) Nevada did “not have a persuasive public health reason for
treating churches differently from restaurants, bars, casinos, and gyms.”
141Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 165 (2007) (The “Court retains an independent constitutional duty to review factual
findings where constitutional rights are at stake.”).
142Wiley & Vladeck, supra, note 38 at 182–83 (suspension is inappropriate for long-lasting emergencies; most case out-
comes are the same with or without suspending ordinary standards; judicial review is needed to hold government
accountable).
143See Smith v. Avino, 91 F.3d 105 (11th Cir. 1996) (upholding curfew after hurricane).
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In the religion cases, no Supreme Court Justice claimed to suspend the rules. No Justice sug-
gested a special emergency standard of review. Nevertheless, in presenting their views of the ordi-
nary standard, the majority of Justices changed the rules. The changes may be subtle, but they are
likely to last, with significant implications for both constitutional law and public health.144
The Justices disagree over how much weight to give certain constitutional rights and when they
are being infringed. But, a likely majority now gives religious freedom presumptively superior
status among constitutional rights. The religion cases shift judicial review of claims of religious
freedom to an even stricter standard by finding discrimination against religion in even neutral and
generally applicable laws. They do so by discounting scientific evidence and making questionable
comparisons between religious and secular activities. Far less scrutiny is likely to be accorded
claims of violations of liberty in future, especially the right to terminate a pregnancy.
Comments in dictum argue that such substantive due process rights should receive minimum
scrutiny whereby judges defer to government claims of public health benefits regardless of evi-
dence to the contrary.
Judicial review of emergency measures is necessary and valuable because it can operate as a
check on government overreaching or using a crisis as pretext to achieve political or ideological
goals.145 It also puts the judiciary in the position of controlling the scope of emergency powers.146
For both reasons, the judiciary should ensure that its own standards of review avoid ideological
predilections and factual errors. Human rights, public health, and the integrity of an independent
judiciary depend on it.
144After this Article was written, the Supreme Court held that a city contract with private adoption agencies discriminated
against religion by requiring all agencies to allow same-sex married couples to foster children in compliance with the city’s
anti-discrimination law. The Court held that the contract did not qualify as “generally applicable” because it authorized the
city to make exceptions—although none had ever been made—and therefore violated the religious beliefs of Catholic Social
Services, which opposed same-sex marriage. Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 2021 U.S. LEXIS 3121 (2021).
145Wiley & Vladeck, supra, note 38, at 183; Ilya Somin, The Case for “Regular” Judicial Review of Coronavirus Emergency
Policies, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Apr. 15, 2020), https://reason.com/2020/04/15/the-case-for-normal-judicial-review-of-
coronavirus-emergency-policies (ordinary judicial review defends against unnecessary deprivations of rights).
146See JOHN FABIAN WITT, AMERICAN CONTAGIONS: EPIDEMICS AND THE LAW FROM SMALLPOX TO COVID-19 (2020)
(arguing that recent decisions preferring religion over public health shifts control of emergencies from the states to the federal
government).
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